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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondents have disputed the applicable standard of review to 
be applied to the issues in this case. It is the parties 
characterization of the issues which leads to the dispute over the 
proper standard of review. 
Mr. Willardson identified as the first issue whether Mr. 
Willardson suffered a compensable industrial accident. That issue 
was identified in Mr. Willardson's Docketing Statement as an issue 
and was not objected to by Respondents; nor did Respondents 
indicate that they would modify or raise other issues at that time. 
In their brief, however, Respondents have for the first time 
specified that the issue is really whether Mr. Willardson work 
activities on April 15, 1988 were the medical cause of his 
disability. After stating that as the issue, they allege that it 
is a factual issue and should be governed by the "substantial 
evidence" test. That argument while correct as a matter of law is 
not responsive to the applicable standard to be applied to the 
issue Petitioner has raised. 
The relevant issue is whether Mr. Willardson suffered a 
compensable industrial injury and not the more restrictive issue of 
medical causation. The Order of the Administrative Law Judge, 
adopted by the Industrial Commission, states as follow: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits associated with the 
work activities of April 15th, 1988 is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to establish a compensable 
industrial injury. (R. at 26). 
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Neither the Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial 
Commission made a single Finding of Fact on the issue of medical 
causation. The Findings of Fact portion of the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge is not proper fact finding but merely an 
"informative summary of the evidence presented" such as was found 
to be inadequate and improper in Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 
1 (Utah App. 1991). The only discussion of medical causation 
occurs in the Conclusions of Law section of the Order. Conclusions 
of Law are reviewed under the* "correction of error standard" and no 
deference need be given to the agency's view of the law. 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-
16(4)(e) (1988). Mor-flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 
328 (Utah 1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division 
of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
The parties agree that the second issue as to whether the 
correct standard of proof was applied should also be governed by 
the "correction of error standard", thus no reply is required to 
Respondent's arguments thereon. 
In regards to the issue of failure to convene a Medical Panel, 
Respondents allege that the standard of "abuse of discretion" 
should apply. "Abuse of discretion" is not a standard of review 
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and the cases cited 
by Respondents were not based on the current standards of review 
necessitated by that Act. The issue is not whether there was an 
abuse of discretion, but rather whether by reason of the Industrial 
Commission's own rules and regulations, there was no discretion to 
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be exercised and whether the Industrial Commission acted unlawfully 
in not convening a Medical Panel. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1) (a) (1988) is the 
determinative statute in this case. Rule 568-1-9 of the Industrial 
Commissions administrative rules is also applicable. They are set 
forth in full in the Addendum hereto as Exhibits A and B. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties do not truly dispute the relevant and applicable 
facts in this matter. Despite the fact that Respondents allege Mr. 
Willardson has failed to marshall the evidence in support in the 
Findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission, there is not a single significant relevant fact cited 
and referred to in Respondent's Brief that does not also appear in 
Mr. Willardson's Statement of Facts. 
Any failure to completely marshall the evidence in support of 
the Order is due to the inadequate Findings as argued both above 
and in Mr. Willardson's original Brief. Indeed, Mr. Willardson's 
Brief contains statements of pre-existing and subsequent injuries 
to which even the Respondents have not referred. The only true 
difference between the Statement of Facts contained in the two 
Briefs is of style and tone; Mr. Willardson has set out the facts 
fully and without commentary, while Respondent's version is 
argumentative and biased. 
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While Mr. Willardson is reluctant to reiterate the facts at 
this stage, it is important to keep in mind that the following are 
the relevant, essential and undisputed facts: 
1. Mr. Willardson undeniably had a history of prior back 
injuries including a lumbar laminectomy in 1971 (R. at 20) , a 
diagnosis of osteopathic and degenerative disk disease of the 
lumbar spine in July of 1993 (R. A-7 at 73) , and a fall at home 
from a ladder in June of 1988 (R. at A-8 at 169). 
2. Mr. Willardson suffered an industrial injury on or about 
April 15, 1988, while in the employ of Respondent Beaver Creek Coal 
Company. (R. at 8). 
3. Mr. Willardson was never able to return to work and it is 
conceded by all parties that he is permanently and totally 
disabled. (R. at 10, 74). 
4. The United States Social Security Administration also 
found him to be totally disabled and awarded him total disability 
benefits beginning April 15, 1988, the date of his industrial 
accident. (R. A-12). 
5. Dr. C. Kotrady in his Physician's Initial Report of Work 
Injury indicated that Mr. Willardson's condition was the result of 
his industrial injury, while also noting the existence of pre-
existing disk disease. (R. at A-2 at 11.5). Dr. Kotrady saw Mr. 
Willardson on two occasions, and his medical records comprise a 
mere six pages, two of which are actually his wife's records. (R. 
at A-2 at 6-12). 
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6. Dr. Kotrady never released Mr. Willardson to return to 
work (despite his initial impression that he would be able to 
return in ten days), and has never directly stated or even implied 
that Mr. Willardson's current total disability condition is not at 
least partially related to his industrial accident. Dr. Kotrady 
last saw Mr. Willardson on April 19, 1988 (R. A-2 at 8) (only four 
days after the industrial accident), and some three years prior to 
the Hearing before the Administrative Law Judge! 
7. Mr. Willardson was treated by Drs. Heiner and Gaufin over 
a two year period between April 1988 and February 1990. He was 
seen approximately every month or two. The medical records of 
those two doctors cover the last two years of Mr. Willardson's 
medical history and comprise some 2 6 pages. Dr. Gaufin, a 
Neurologist, specifically found degenerative disk and joint 
disease, but stressed that the lumbar radiculopathy was secondary 
to the work related injury of April 15, 1988 (R. A-6 at 58-59). 
8. Dr. Kotrady never issued a direct opinion as to the 
relationship between disability sustained by Mr. Willardson and the 
industrial accident. Dr. Heiner gave him a 30% whole person 
rating, with 50% of that being due to the industrial accident (R. 
A-4 at 42-46) . Dr. Gaufin gave a 15% whole person rating, with 50% 
due to the industrial accident. (R. A-6 at 60). 
9. The Respondents did not have Mr. Willardson examined by a 
physician of their own choosing; nor did they present any contrary 
medical evidence at the hearing. The Administrative Law Judge did 
not refer Mr. Willardson to a Medical Panel. 
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While the Respondents attempt to cast doubt on Mr. 
Willardson's testimony about his injuries resulting from "screen 
jerking," that argument is not relevant to the resolution of his 
claim. Even if the accident occurred as the Administrative Law 
Judge states as "the result of lifting twenty-twenty five pound 
wire mesh screens and lifting them to a belt, a procedure involving 
climbing, stretching, reaching and twisting motions", (R. at 25), 
it would still be compensable. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission, 766 
P.2d 1089 (Utah App. 1988). 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) gives the 
Industrial Commission discretion in determining which cases are to 
be referred to Medical Panels. The Industrial Commission pursuant 
to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 63-46B-16, et. seq., (1988) adopted rules and regulations 
governing the exercise of that discretion. R568-1-9 removes the 
Industrial Commissions general discretion and specifies the terms 
and conditions in which a Medical Panel "will be utilized". 
The Industrial Commission is bound by it's own formally 
promulgated rules and regulations, and does not have the discretion 
to ignore them or to modify them without engaging in formal rule -
making procedures. This case involves "conflicting medical reports 
of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person". Under such facts, a Medical Panel must be used and 
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this case should be remanded back to the Industrial Commission for 
the purpose of convening a Medical Panel• 
The issue as to whether a compensable industrial injury 
occurred turns on the question of medical causation. The existing 
Orders by the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission are deficient in that they fail to engage in adequate 
fact finding. Such failure prevents Mr. Willardson from fully 
marshalling all the evidence in support of the Order, and showing 
that they are insufficient and inadequate. There is, however, 
substantial evidence of permanent, partial impairment as the result 
of an industrial injury. To the extent that there is any doubt as 
to medical causation and whether a compensable injury has occurred, 
that issue can only be adequately and fairly resolved after a 
Medical Panel has been convened and makes its report. This matter 
should be remanded for review by a Medical Panel. 
A R G U M E N T 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
Although Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1) (a) (1988) 
makes the referral of medical aspects of a case to a Medical Panel 
discretionary with the Industrial Commission, the Industrial 
Commission has utilized that discretion in enacting rules and 
regulations specifying the standards for when a Medical Panel will 
be convened. Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the 
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"Necessity of submitting a case to a Medical Panel" provides in 
relevant part, as follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, UCA, the Industrial 
Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law 
Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) . Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b). Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cut-off date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or, 
(c) . Medical expenses and controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.00... (emphasis added). See Addendum, 
Exhibit A. 
Respondents argue that referral to a Medical Panel is not 
required because there was no credible evidence of medical 
causation. While conceding that Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner's 
reports establish conflicting medical reports which vary by more 
than 5%, they dismissed those reports as not being "credible." 
They allege lack of credibility on the basis that the reports were 
only "fill in the blank forms", that the Doctors did not have 
access to all of Mr. Willardson's medical records, and that their 
reports do not specifically state that the ratings are based on the 
AMA Guidelines. That argument is fallacious. 
Indeed, it must be remembered that there is no evidence that 
Dr. Heiner or Dr. Gaufin did not have - or even needed - all of 
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Mr, Willardson's records or that their reports were not based upon 
the AMA Guidelines. Significantly, they were both Mr. Willardson's 
treating physicians. Although their disability ratings appear on 
a short form, they are based upon substantial medical reports 
compiled over a two (2) year period. 
The rule does not require that there be conflicting credible 
reports, that the Doctors have all of the medical records or even 
that the medical reports be based upon the AMA Guidelines. All the 
Rule requires is that there be "conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person." 
In effect, Respondents are attempting to amend, outside of 
formal rule making procedures, the Industrial Commission7s rules to 
provide that Medical Panel referral is only required when the 
Administrative Law Judge finds the reports credible and based on 
all the evidence in the case, as well as based upon the AMA 
Guidelines. The Rule, however, does not so require. If such was 
required, one wonders why a Medical Panel would even be required 
since the existing reports would be virtually conclusive. The rule 
flatly provides that a panel "will be used when there are 
conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary by more than 5% of the whole person." 
Although the statute makes referral to a Medical Panel 
discretionary, the Industrial Commission Rule exercises that 
discretion to make it mandatory should the requirements in 
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subsections (a) \ (b) or (c) of the Rule be met. In response to 
this argument Respondents make three points: 
1. Legislative intent. Respondents argue that the Industrial 
Commission cannot adopt a mandatory rule when the legislature 
provided that referral would be discretionary. It is clear that 
given a grant of discretion, an administrative agency can adopt 
rules and regulations governing the application of the discretion. 
Indeed, the failure to do so itself may be an abuse of discretion. 
Were this not so, the Industrial Commission would be constantly 
subject to claims of "abuse of discretion" since it would have no 
standards to guide it in its; exercise of discretion. There is no 
conflict between the legislature's grant of discretionary authority 
to the Industrial Commission, and the Industrial Commission's rule 
that it will exercise that discretion by making referrals mandatory 
under specific circumstances. Such rule-making is a proper 
utilization of the Industrial Commission's discretionary authority. 
2. Exceeding the scope of legislative authority. Respondents 
also argue that the Industrial Commission Rule, providing for 
mandatory referral in certain circumstances exceeds the scope of 
the discretionary authority granted by statute. Respondents are 
essentially remaking the same point they argued above. They cite 
no authority on point for this position. A regulation which makes 
referral to a Medical Panel mandatory under certain circumstances 
is consistent with the discretionary authority to make those 
referrals granted by the statute. The regulation is not void for 
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the mere reason that it specifies the terms and conditions under 
which the grant of discretion will be exercised. 
3. The Administrative Law Judge can disregard the finding of 
the Medical Panel. Mr. Willardson does not dispute the fact that 
the Medical Panel report is not conclusive on the issue of medical 
causation. The Administrative Law Judge, and indeed the Industrial 
Commission itself, may, after viewing the evidence as a whole, 
including the report of the Medical Panel, make the decision that 
other evidence in the case outweighs the findings and conclusions 
of a Medical Panel. Respondent's argument, however, does not at 
all address whether a Medical Panel report must in the first 
instance be received and considered. 
The Respondent's argument that administrative agencies' rules 
are mere "guidelines" which can be disregarded at will has already 
been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In State, 
by and through Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System 
Council, 614 P. 2d 1259, the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The Council cannot violate its own procedure rules.... 
Defendants contend that procedure rules are mere 
'guidelines', but administrative regulations are presumed 
to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or 
followed by the agency to suit its own purpose. Such is 
the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without 
compelling reasons for not following its own rules, an 
agency must be held to them, (citations omitted) Id. at 
1263. 
That holding is well grounded and finds authority in virtually 
all other jurisdictions. An administrative agency may not violate 
or ignore its own rules, and where it fails to follow the rules 
which it has promulgated, its orders are unlawful. Clay v. Arizona 
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Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 779 P.2d 349 (Arizona 1989), Tew v. 
City of Topeka Police and Fire Civil Service Commission, 696 P.2d 
1279 (Kansas 1985). State Ex Rel. Nevada Tax Commission v. Safeway 
Super Service Stations, Inc. 668 P.2d 291 (Nevada 1983). U. S. v. 
RCA Alaska Communications Inc., 597 P.2d 489 (Alaska 1979). 
Should there be any conflict between a statutory grant of 
authority and an Administrative rule, the rule controls where the 
matter at issue is merely "procedural" as distinguished from being 
"substantive." State v. Hawkins, 680 P.2d 522, 523 (Arizona App. 
1984). Clearly, referral of a Workers Compensation case to a 
Medical Panel is not a substantive matter but a procedural one. As 
Respondents have pointed out, the Medical Panel report is merely 
additional evidence which must be weighed with the record as a 
whole and may be disregarded by the fact finder, if a proper basis 
exists for it. In such cases, the Administrative Rule controls 
over the statutory enactment. 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and Mr. Willardson's permanent total disability, if not 
clear, was at least uncertain. Failure to refer the matter to a 
Medical Panel was, therefore, error. The Order Denying the Motion 
for Review should at least be reversed and the matter remanded with 
directions to refer the matter to a Medical Panel, since failure to 
do so was in direct conflict with the Industrial Commission's Rule. 
The failure to obtain a Medical Panel opinion resulted in the 
Administrative Law Judge lacking essential and necessary 
information to adjudicate Mr. Willardson's claim. 
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II 
PETITIONER SUSTAINED AN INJURY BY REASON OF AN INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
(a) Petitioner has marshalled the evidence indicating 
that it is insufficient to support the Order of the 
Industrial Commission. 
As stated above, Mr. Willardson has referenced all of the 
medical evidence which allegedly supports the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge, and that evidence is overwhelmingly 
insufficient to support the Order entered. Mr. Willardson has 
admitted that he has a "history of prior back injuries and has been 
undeniably suffering from moderate to severe arthritic changes in 
his lumbar spine and pelvis." (R. at 36). He painstakingly 
recounted and referenced his prior medical history. The findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission, 
however, are based solely on the scant medical records of Dr. 
Kotrady. The four pages of medical records which relate to Mr. 
Willardson cover only two visits over a four day period. The 
records and findings of Dr.'s Gaufin and Heiner on the other hand 
encompass two years of regular physical examination and treatment. 
Respondents are unable to indicate any specific evidence which Mr. 
Willardson should have but failed to marshall in support of the 
Order below. 
The Findings of Fact in this case are grossly deficient. The 
Administrative Law Judge did not engage in proper fact finding; 
rather, the Findings of Fact portion of the Order is merely a 
summary of the evidence presented. This Court has previously 
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stated that a rehearsal of contradictory evidence does not 
constitute findings of fact. Adams v. Board of Review, supra. The 
findings made by the Administrative Law Judge are deficient in that 
they fail to address in detail the issue of medical causation. As 
argued above the only discussion of medical causation occurs not in 
the Findings of Fact portion of the Order but in the Conclusions of 
Law portion. 
The Administrative Law Judge spends a great deal of time 
discussing Mr. Willardson's prior medical problems, but does not 
make precise Findings as to his current medical condition and the 
causes for it. This failure was compounded by the Industrial 
Commissions unwarranted refusal to submit this matter to a Medical 
Panel as complained above. 
The Administrative Law Judge's purported Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, as well as the Industrial 
Commission's Order Denying the Motion for Review, should at a 
minimum be vacated and a new Order entered with detailed and 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusions were reached. Failure to do so denies Mr. Willardson 
the ability to marshall the evidence in support of the findings and 
show that it is not substantial. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989). 
(b) The Industrial Accident aggravated Petitioner's 
pre-existing condition. 
Respondents are correct that the aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition is compensable only if it is a permanent, ratable 
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aggravation. Respondent's error, however, is that Mr. Willardson's 
industrial injury did in fact aggravate his pre-existing condition. 
The medical records and reports of Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner make 
clear that at least 50% of Mr. Willardson's present disability 
status is directly and causally related to his industrial accident. 
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which would 
suggest that Mr. Willardson's injuries were not at least partially 
the result of the industrial accident. 
The Administrative Law Judge cannot arbitrarily discount 
competent, uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial 
injury was the cause of Mr. Willardson7s present permanent, total 
disability. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 709 P. 2d 
1168 (Utah 1985). Frito-Lav, Inc. v. Jacobs. 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 
1984) . 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Industrial Commission violated its own rules and 
regulations specifying that cases such as Mr. Willardson will be 
submitted to a Medical Panel. The Rule does not require that a 
referral will only occur when the conflicting medical reports are 
found by an Administrative Law Judge to be credible or that they 
must be based upon AMA Guidelines. Unfortunately, any failure to 
find medical causation in this case was undoubtedly compounded by 
the failure to refer this matter to a Medical Panel. 
The Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission are deficient in that they fail to engage in proper fact 
finding. The Orders do not "sufficiently detail and include enough 
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subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each of the factual issues was reached," Adams, 
supra. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Willardson is presently permanently 
and totally disabled, and that that condition occurred as the 
result of his industrial accident. Prior to his accident he was 
gainfully employed, and following that accident he has been unable 
to return to work. He is entitled to benefits under the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either 
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical 
evidence presently in the record, or in the alternative, to convene 
a Medical Panel. 
DATED this 16th day of February, 1$93. 
VI 
Attorney 
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Reply Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 
16th day of February, 1993 to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Steven J. Aeschbacher, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Kerry L. Willardson 
Post Office Box 209 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
File 
(1 original & 7 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(2 copies) 
(1 copy) 
copies) 
DABffEY & DABNEY, 
/\ 1 
i| \ ft I jS ^ ^ # ^V 
[\ 
\ 
.c. 
/ J 
JS DABNEY 
Attorney for Petlitioiier 
willrdsn\willbrf.rpl 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A; Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988). 
EXHIBIT B; Utah Administrative Code, Rule R568-1-9. 
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — 
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. (Last amended 1991) 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if 
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to 
an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall, 
except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation 
of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its sole 
discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time 
or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding 
responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or 
medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and 
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may determine 
to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may 
require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from 
performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the 
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupation 
al disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged/ 
accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so, 
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail with 
return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the 
United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance 
carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no 
written objections are filed within that period, the report is considered 
admitted in evidence. 
EXHIBIT A 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the 
panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the 
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding, 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the 
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, the 
commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman 
or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing 
for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical 
consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before 
the commission shall be paid out of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, (as last 
amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988) 
R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Industrial Commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
EXHIBIT B 
